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Cities nationwide increasingly engage in affirmative, plaintiff-side
litigation to protect their residents. But despite this trend, standing
remains a persistent challenge in municipal affirmative litigation—
particularly in federal court, and particularly in impact litigation.
I have previously proposed one way to give cities standing in federal
court more in line with that of states, and with the role that cities
play in their residents’ lives: extending to municipalities the doctrine
of associational standing, which nonprofits and associations use to
speak for their members in court.
Recent works have both amplified and critiqued that initial pro-
posal. With these additional considerations in hand, we are well
positioned to briefly revisit whether cities should be able to rely on a
theory of associational standing to protect their residents, and what
that tells us about standing law and local power more broadly. I
argue that associational standing should still be a viable option for
municipal standing in federal court. More broadly, I contend that a
stable, reliable form of standing for cities to represent the interests of
their constituents in federal court would be good for both the doctrine
and the cities.
* Kaitlin Ainsworth Caruso is a former Fellow and Lecturer at Yale Law School and has
worked in state and local consumer protection and civil rights. J.D. 2010, Yale Law School.
The opinions in this Essay should not be ascribed to any current or former employer. Many
thanks to Jill Habig, the Public Rights Project, and Kathleen Morris for helpful comments and
contributions to this Essay and for ongoing discussions of local government power and
capacity. Many thanks to the dedicated staff of the William & Mary Law Review Online. All
errors are my own.
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INTRODUCTION
Cities have been busy. They increasingly conduct affirmative,
plaintiff-side litigation on a variety of issues affecting their resi-
dents, from the hyper-local to the national1—part of what Professor
Kathleen Morris called a “rising culture of engagement” at the
municipal level.2 I, like many others, have welcomed this trend as
both an important development for effective civil law enforcement
and a reflection of the key role that municipalities play in their
residents’ lives.3
Many of us have observed, however, that standing remains a
persistent challenge in municipal affirmative litigation—partic-
ularly in federal court,4 and particularly in impact litigation.5 States
routinely pursue litigation to protect their citizens in federal court.6
Many have pointed out that cities have interests in the health and
welfare of their residents very much like those of states.7 However,
few federal courts seem willing to allow cities to invoke the special
standing doctrine that states have to litigate those interests. As an
alternative, I have argued that cities should be able to rely on the
doctrine of associational standing,8 a similar concept that gives
1. See generally, e.g., Kathleen S. Morris, Cities Seeking Justice: Local Government
Litigation in the Public Interest, in HOW CITIES WILL SAVE THE WORLD: URBAN INNOVATION
IN THE FACE OF POPULATION FLOWS, CLIMATE CHANGE AND ECONOMIC INEQUALITY 189 (Ray
Brescia & John Travis Marshall eds., 2016).
2. Kathleen S. Morris, San Francisco and the Rising Culture of Engagement in Local
Public Law Offices, in WHY THE LOCAL MATTERS: FEDERALISM, LOCALISM, AND PUBLIC IN-
TEREST ADVOCACY: PAPERS FROM THE ELEVENTH ANNUAL LIMAN COLLOQUIUM AT YALE LAW
SCHOOL 51, 54 (2008), https://law.yale.edu/sites/default/files/documents/pdf/liman_whyThe
LocalMatters.pdf [https://perma.cc/5MEX-W6N8].
3. Kaitlin Ainsworth Caruso, Associational Standing for Cities, 47 CONN. L. REV. 59, 61
(2014). 
4. See, e.g., Sarah L. Swan, Plaintiff Cities, 71 VAND. L. REV. 1227, 1252-53 (2019)
(“Standing presents the biggest doctrinal hurdle of legal legitimacy for plaintiff cities.”);
Kathleen C. Engel, Do Cities Have Standing? Redressing the Externalities of Predatory
Lending, 38 CONN. L. REV. 355, 389-90 (2006).
5. Impact litigation “seek[s] to use the courts to effect widespread social changes.” PETER
H. SCHUCK, MEDITATIONS OF A MILITANT MODERATE: COOL VIEWS ON HOT TOPICS 103 (2006).
6. That trend has not been universally welcomed. See generally, e.g., Ann Woolhandler
& Michael G. Collins, Reining in State Standing, 94 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 2015 (2019). 
7. Caruso, supra note 3, at 68-69, 68 nn. 50-52, 69 nn. 53-54.
8. “Associational standing” is sometimes called “organizational standing.” Both terms,
confusingly, are sometimes used to describe the standing of an organization or association
3
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standing to other public and private associations to litigate in the
interests of their members.9
Several years on, the tide of local engagement has only continued
to rise. Options for aggregate private litigation continue to narrow,
and the federal government had (at least until quite recently)
stepped back from enforcing many rights-protective laws on behalf
of the public, increasing the need for local impact litigation.10 Thus,
cities and counties11 have recently brought or joined suits relating
to alleged abuses in the pharmaceuticals industry,12 predatory lend-
ing,13 environmental impact,14 and unlawful federal government
conduct,15 among a myriad of other wrongs.16 In some cases, cities
brought suit alongside their states; in others, they brought suit in
spite of their state.17
both when it is directly injured and when it bases standing on the injury to one of its
members. See, e.g., Swan, supra note 4, at 1256 & n.182. This Essay concerns the latter,
representational theory.
9. See Kaitlin A. Caruso, The Municipal Corporation, Revisited: Rationalizing the Law
of Cities After Hunter v. Pittsburgh, HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV., nn.8-16 and accompanying text
(July 11, 2012), https://harvardcrcl.org/cr-cl-presents-a-colloquium-the-case-for-local-constitu
tional-enforcement/ [https://perma.cc/5NQ2-T7UF] (sketching the possibility of municipal
associational standing); accord Josh Bendor, Municipal Constitutional Rights: A New Ap-
proach, 31 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 389, 420 & n.214 (2013). 
10. See generally Jill E. Habig & Joanna Pearl, Cities as Engines of Justice, 45 FORDHAM
URB. L.J. 1159, 1163-65 (2018); Morris, supra note 1, at 189-90.
11. In this Essay, I use “cities,” “counties,” and “municipalities” interchangeably; I focus
on general-purpose municipal entities, as distinct from special-purpose sub-state entities like,
say, a water district. 
12. See Sarah L. Swan, Preempting Plaintiff Cities, 45 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1241, 1258-59
(2018). See generally Nino C. Monea, Cities v. Big Pharma: Municipal Affirmative Litigation
and the Opioid Crisis, 50 URB. LAW. 87 (2019). 
13. See, e.g., Bank of Am. Corp. v. City of Miami, 137 S. Ct. 1296, 1300-01 (2017).
14. Nina A. Mendelson, Tribes, Cities, and Children: Emerging Voices in Environmental
Litigation, 34 J. LAND USE & ENV’T L. 237, 243-44 (2019).
15. Dino Grandoni & Brady Dennis, States and Cities Sue EPA Over Rollback of Climate 
Regulations Aimed at Coal Plants, WASH. POST (Aug. 13, 2019, 3:14 PM), https://
www.washingtonpost.com/climate-environment/2019/08/13/states-cities-sue-trump-epa-
over-rollback-climate-regulations-aimed-coal-plants/ [https://perma.cc/6PQN-PTFD]; 
Chicago and 3 Other Cities Sue to Stop Spread of Ghost Guns, ASSOCIATED PRESS WIRE 
SERV. (Aug. 26, 2020), https://apnews.com/85899c2211b4082e1a6db13b697b3a51 [https://
perma.cc/WB2H-HVRF].
16. See Morris, supra note 1, at 189; Swan, supra note 4, at 1230-31.
17. Compare Grandoni & Dennis, supra note 15, with Swan, supra note 12, at 1258-59,
and Daniel Fisher, Cities vs. States: A Looming Battle for Control of High-Stakes Opioid
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As cities have continued (or tried) to tackle crucial issues through
affirmative litigation, scholarly and critical attention to the trend
has likewise increased.18 We are now well positioned to briefly
revisit whether cities should be able to rely on a theory of associa-
tional standing to protect their residents, and what that tells us
about standing law and local power more broadly. I argue that
associational standing should still be a viable option for municipal
standing in federal court. More broadly, I identify several paths to
standing and contend that a stable, reliable form of standing for
cities to represent the interests of their constituents in federal court
would be good for both the doctrine and the cities.
Part II of this Essay provides a very brief refresher on key doc-
trines—standing generally, and parens patriae and associational
standing in particular. Part III revisits parts of the analysis of
whether cities can or should invoke the doctrine of associational
standing in light of new developments and critiques. I conclude that
cities still should, both doctrinally and normatively, be able to do so.
Part IV then assesses what other changes could supplement cities’
representational standing in federal court. Part V briefly concludes.
I. STANDING STANDARDS
A. Article III Standing Basics
Article III of the Constitution provides that the federal judicial
power extends to deciding “cases” and “controversies.”19 Ostensibly
to stay within that constitutional role, federal courts require plain-
tiffs to show that they have standing to bring a claim, generally by
demonstrating that they “have suffered an ‘injury in fact’—an
invasion of a legally protected interest which is (a) concrete and
18. See, e.g., Heather Elliott, Associations and Cities as (Forbidden) Pure Private Attorneys
General, 61 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1329 (2020); Eli Savit, States Empowering Plaintiff Cities,
52 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 581 (2019); Swan, supra note 4; Kathleen S. Morris, Expanding
Local Enforcement of State and Federal Consumer Protection Laws, 40 FORDHAM URB. L.J.
1903, 1908 (2013) [hereinafter Morris, Expanding Local Enforcement]; Kathleen S. Morris,
The Case for Local Constitutional Enforcement, 47 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 1, 4-5 (2012)
[hereinafter Morris, Local Constitutional Enforcement]; Engel, supra note 4, at 389; Claire
McCusker, Comment, The Federalism Challenges of Impact Litigation by State and Local
Government Actors, 118 YALE L.J. 1557 (2009).
19. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2.
5
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particularized, and (b) ‘actual or imminent.’”20 The injury must be
“fairly ... trace[able] to the challenged action of the defendant” and
“‘likely,’ as opposed to merely ‘speculative,’” to be redressable “‘by a
favorable decision.’”21
The Supreme Court also has long used “prudential standing”
rules—“judicially self-imposed limits on the exercise of federal
jurisdiction.”22 Prudential standing limits have required that
plaintiffs assert their own rights, not those of third parties; that the
complaint falls within the “zone of interests” protected by the
relevant statute; and that plaintiffs not seek redress for “general-
ized grievances” shared by many.23 In 2014, in Lexmark Interna-
tional, Inc. v. Static Control Components, Inc.,24 however, the Su-
preme Court reclassified the “zone of interests” question as one of
the scope of the cause of action, and the bar on generalized griev-
ances as a constitutional requirement.25 It found the resistance to
third-party standing “harder to classify,” and so it did not classify
it.26 Again in 2018, the Court declined to further specify the re-
lationship between Article III and third-party standing.27
The Court also recently considered city standing—specifically, to
sue for Fair Housing Act (FHA) violations visited upon city resi-
dents.28 In Bank of America Corp. v. City of Miami, Miami sued
banks that it claimed engaged in predatory lending, hurting (par-
ticularly) minority residents and, in turn, the City.29 The Supreme
Court concluded that the City could be a “person aggrieved” with a
20. United States v. Windsor, 570 U.S. 744, 757 (2013) (quoting Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife,
504 U.S. 555, 560-61 (1992)); see also Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 136 S. Ct. 1540, 1547-48 (2016)
(requiring harm to be both concrete and particularized).
21. Windsor, 570 U.S. at 757 (alteration in original) (quoting Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560-61);
see also Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Env’t Servs., Inc., 528 U.S. 167, 180-81 (2000).
22. Elk Grove Unified Sch. Dist. v. Newdow, 542 U.S. 1, 11 (2004) (quoting Allen v.
Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 751 (1984)).
23. Engel, supra note 4, at 369-70.
24. 134 S. Ct. 1377 (2014).
25. Id. at 1386-87, 1387 n.3.
26. Id. at 1387 n.3. One view, however, is that third-party standing issues can now “be
handled as issues primarily of Congress’s intent with respect to particular statutory schemes.”
Ernest A. Young, Prudential Standing After Lexmark International, Inc. v. Static Control
Components, Inc., 10 DUKE J. CONST. L. & PUB. POL’Y 149, 154-55 (2014).
27. Starr Int’l Co. v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 1324 (2018) (denying certiorari).
28. Bank of Am. Corp. v. City of Miami, 137 S. Ct. 1296, 1301 (2017).
29. Id. at 1301-02.
6
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statutory right to sue under the FHA (a category, it noted, that was
as broad as Article III could permit).30 In finding that the City’s
claims fit within the relevant zone of interests, the Court noted that
the banks allegedly “hindered the City's efforts to create integrated,
stable neighborhoods” and “reduced property values, diminishing
the City's property-tax revenue and increasing demand for munici-
pal services.”31 The Court had previously recognized that cities could
sue to remedy behavior that imposes social and economic harms,32
but it shied away from suggesting that the community-based (non-
financial) harms were adequate to support city standing.
Bank of America was not argued as a representational case, but
one might wonder why, given that the heart of the harm seems to
have been to residents. One answer is simply that other standing
cases said so;33 as discussed below, an effort to frame Miami’s in-
terest as representational might well have failed.
B. Parens Patriae Standing
When states34 sue in federal court, the Supreme Court has said
that they generally pursue one of three types of interests: sovereign,
quasi-sovereign, or proprietary.35 Proprietary harms are like those
30. Id. at 1303. Unfortunately for the City, the Court then remanded with instructions to
impose a heightened causation standard. Id. at 1301, 1305. On remand, the Eleventh Circuit
concluded that the City adequately pled causation for its claims of lost tax revenue, but not
for increased municipal expenses. City of Miami v. Wells Fargo & Co., 923 F.3d 1260, 1263-65
(11th Cir. 2019); accord City of Oakland v. Wells Fargo & Co., 972 F.3d 1112, 1117 (9th Cir.
2020) (ruling similarly in Oakland’s suit).
31. Bank of Am., 137 S. Ct. at 1304.
32. See id. at 1304-05 (citing Gladstone, Realtors v. Village of Bellwood, 441 U.S. 91
(1979)).
33. Seth Davis, The Private Rights of Public Governments, 94 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 2091,
2105 (2019) (noting that it is good strategy to characterize financial injuries as proprietary
harms because “[a] ‘Wallet Injury’ is the ‘paradigmatic’ injury in fact,” but suggesting that the
typical analysis of such a state injury is oversimplified (first quoting Hein v. Freedom from
Religion Found., Inc., 551 U.S. 587, 619 (2007) (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment); and
then quoting Danvers Motor Co. v. Ford Motor Co., 432 F.3d 286, 291 (3d Cir. 2005))).
34. Or entities like states, e.g., Puerto Rico.
35. See Alfred L. Snapp & Son, Inc., v. Puerto Rico ex rel. Barez, 458 U.S. 592, 601-02
(1982) (discussing states’ different interests). Governments may also litigate on behalf of a
private real party in interest, but the Court deems such actions essentially private suits. Id.
at 602.
7
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of any other injured entity—for example, property damage.36
Sovereign interests are governance interests—in things like
adopting and maintaining a legal code.37 Quasi-sovereign interests
are a hazy category, but generally relate to the health and welfare
of constituents and include things like the interest in maintaining
clean air and water.38
The Supreme Court has described a state’s quasi-sovereign
interests as giving rise to parens patriae standing,39 which allows a
state to sue most private parties if it can show (1) a quasi-sovereign
interest; (2) harm to a substantial portion of the population; (3) a
distinct injury from that of its constituents; and (4) a cause of action
under the relevant statute.40 The Supreme Court has said that
states receive “special solicitude in ... standing analysis,”41 but what
exactly that solicitude is or does remains unclear,42 as does whether
a state must satisfy Article III in addition to the doctrinal require-
ments for parens patriae standing.43
Though in reality cities have valid “quasi-sovereign” interests like
states, federal courts have been very reluctant to recognize them for
standing.44 Federal courts typically deny parens patriae standing to
cities, noting that cities, as mere creatures of their states, lack the
sovereignty on which state (or federal) parens patriae standing is
based.45 As several leading federalism and localism scholars have
36. Id. at 601-02.
37. Id. at 601.
38. Id. at 602, 607.
39. Id. at 600-01; see also Katherine Mims Crocker, Note, Securing Sovereign State
Standing, 97 VA. L. REV. 2051, 2072-74, 2082 (2011) (identifying ongoing muddiness in the
case treatment of state interests for standing analyses).
40. Engel, supra note 4, at 368; see Lexmark Int’l, Inc. v. Static Control Components, Inc.,
134 S. Ct. 1377, 1387-88, 1387 n.3 (2014) (explaining that the zone-of-interests test is a
measure of the cause of action).
41. Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 520 (2007). It is not clear that broad standing
for states has historically been the norm, however. See Woolhandler & Collins, supra note 6,
at 2019-20.
42. See Caruso, supra note 3, at 66-68; see also Ernest A. Young, State Standing and
Cooperative Federalism, 94 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1893, 1922 (2019) (arguing that the “special
solicitude” really only offered Massachusetts extra latitude regarding the “traceability and
redressability” prongs of standing analysis).
43. See Caruso, supra note 3, at 66-68. 
44. See id. at 68-69, 69 nn.53-55.
45. See id. at 69-70, 70 n.56; see also, e.g., United States v. Walker River Irrigation Dist.,
No. 3:73-cv-00128-RCJ-WGC, at *6-8 (D. Nev. May 28, 2015) (CaseText) (denying a county
8
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noted, there is little to recommend the fetishizing of states’ historic
sovereignty in modern federalism doctrine, as it poorly reflects
current federal-state (and by extension, state-local) governance
relationships.46 Unfortunately, federal courts’ adherence to old
discourse around state sovereignty pervades the doctrine relating to
governmental standing; this Essay will largely take such arguments
on their own terms so as to provide practical guidance for prospec-
tive litigation.47 And in litigation, the best that a non-sovereign city
can often now hope for is a court that will broadly define a city’s
proprietary interests as encompassing community welfare in some
way. A few cases do just that—making proprietary interests include
any injury to the “city itself,” in ways that verge on (if not veer into)
sovereign or quasi-sovereign interests.48
parens patriae standing).
46. See, e.g., Kathleen S. Morris, Rebellious Localism (forthcoming 2021) (on file with
author) (manuscript at 39-44) (noting that under the constitutions of a supermajority of
states, the people and not the state government are sovereign, and arguing that that
shorthand way of describing state and local power—by focusing on state or local government
entities rather than as state and local-level agents of a sovereign populace, or how the work
of governance operates in practice— contributes to distorted and misleading understanding
of federal-state-local relationships); Heather K. Gerken, Federalism 3.0, 105 CALIF. L. REV.
1695 (2017); Jessica Bulman-Pozen, From Sovereignty and Process to Administration and
Politics: The Afterlife of American Federalism, 123 YALE L.J. 1920 (2014); Nestor M. Davidson,
Cooperative Localism: Federal-Local Collaboration in an Era of State Sovereignty, 93 VA. L.
REV. 959 (2007).
47. Cf. Aziz Z. Huq, State Standing's Uncertain Stakes, 94 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 2127,
2137 (2019) (“Given the mutable and elusive nature of sovereignty as a conceptual matter, it
was probably inevitable that any effort to create a doctrinal rule for state standing rooted in
that concept would generate confusion and instability. As a result, even if the notion of
‘sovereignty’ can provide a comforting verbal touchstone for analysis of state standing, it is
unlikely to shed any meaningful analytic clarity on the matter.” (footnote omitted)).
48. See, e.g., City of Sausalito v. O'Neill, 386 F.3d 1186, 1197-98 (9th Cir. 2004) (noting
that a municipality’s “proprietary interests” include “its ability to enforce land-use and health
regulations,” tax, and protect natural resources); New Mexico v. McAleenan, 450 F. Supp. 3d.
1130, 1188 n.15 (D.N.M. 2020) (in a city and state’s challenge to a federal policy that sent the
city hundreds of “unassisted asylum seekers” weekly, denying the city parens patriae standing
but finding standing based on “harm to the city itself” in its obligation to protect residents
from “health and safety crises.”). For an excellent discussion of the deceptive complexity of a
state’s “proprietary” interests, see Seth Davis, supra note 33. As some scholars have noted,
however, public corporations like cities may often be subjected to a narrower vision of their
rights even than their private counterparts, despite their broad responsibilities. See, e.g.,
Hannah J. Wiseman, Rethinking Municipal Corporate Rights, 61 B.C. L. REV. 591 (2020);
Richard C. Schragger, When White Supremacists Invade a City, 104 VA. L. REV. ONLINE 58,
70 (2018) (“So too the public/private distinction makes it difficult for a city qua city to assert
that private actors are threatening its peace and security.”).
9
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C. Associational Standing
As an alternative to parens patriae standing, I previously argued
that cities should be able to avail themselves of associational
standing—the doctrine that groups and associations like, famously,
the NAACP, use to represent their members in federal court.49 This
form of standing is explicitly representational, depending on harm
to members and not to the entity itself.
In the leading case on associational standing, Hunt v. Washington
State Apple Advertising Commission,50 the Court explained that an
association can sue on its members’ behalf when “(a) its members
would otherwise have standing to sue in their own right; (b) the
interests it seeks to protect are germane to the organization's
purpose; and (c) neither the claim asserted nor the relief requested
requires the participation of individual members in the lawsuit.”51
The commission in that case was state-created, with legally man-
dated “members.”52 Even so, the Court found that the commission
acted like a private trade association: it served a “specialized
segment of the ... community,” and its constituents “possess[ed] all
of the indicia of membership in an organization” because “[t]hey
alone elect[ed]” commission members, were eligible to serve as com-
missioners, and “finance[d] its activities” through levied assess-
ments.53 The Court observed that the members used the commission
to express and protect their interests and that the commission itself
would be affected by the litigation, which ensured “that concrete
adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues upon which
the court so largely depends for illumination of difficult ... ques-
tions.”54
49. See supra notes 8-9 and accompanying text.
50. 432 U.S. 333 (1977).
51. Id. at 343.
52. Id. at 344-45.
53. Id.
54. Id. at 345 (quoting Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 204 (1962)).
10
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II. MUNICIPAL ASSOCIATIONAL STANDING
A. Where We Started
I previously argued that cities straightforwardly, if not intui-
tively, fit the Hunt associational standing criteria.55 Specifically, I
argued that while we may not intuitively refer to city residents as
members of their city, cities do serve a geographically specialized
segment of the community,56 and “[i]n a very real sense ... pro-
vide[ ] the means by which the[ir residents] express their collective
views and protect their collective interests.”57
Moreover, I argued that city residents possess the indicia of
membership described in Hunt: they pick and comprise the city
leadership and fund city activities through their taxes and fees.58 If
its residents are injured, then, the city should be able to show that
it has at least one “member” with standing.
And again, although we do not generally talk about the “purpose”
of a city, these public corporations have myriad powers and ob-
ligations under state statutory, constitutional, common, and local
law that can be proved to a federal court.59 When a city shows that
it has a legal purpose that is germane to the suit, it will also assure
the court that the city’s own interests are at stake, too.60 And in
injunctive cases over which there is no profound intra-city conflict,
a city may very well be able to show that no participation by in-
dividual city residents will be required.61
This overview suffices for us to consider new critiques and
developments in the area of city representational standing. For the
sake of brevity, I will not repeat here all the details of the normative
case for city representational standing or all of the fine points about
associational standing doctrine that map onto city structures and
their relationships with their citizens. To those interested in the
55. See Caruso, supra note 3, at 74-75.
56. See id. at 75-78.
57. Hunt, 432 U.S. at 345.
58. Caruso, supra note 3, at 77-78.
59. See id. at 81-82.
60. See id.
61. See id. at 80-81.
11
Caruso: Who and What Is a City "For"? Municipal Associational Standing Re
Published by William & Mary Law School Scholarship Repository, 2021
116 WILLIAM & MARY LAW REVIEW ONLINE [Vol. 62:105
fuller consideration, I refer you to my initial essay62 and the sub-
sequent analysis by Professor Sarah Swan.63
B. A City Is Not an All-Purpose Litigant
Recently, Professor Heather Elliott argued that municipal asso-
ciational standing creates constitutional problems underrecognized
in my prior article—essentially, it would risk granting too much
standing.64 As an initial matter, we appear to agree that association-
al standing plausibly creates an avenue for more city standing in
federal court.65 We have also both considered that courts may seek
a limiting principle to avoid granting potentially broad municipal
associational standing;66 Professor Elliott, though, has helpfully
identified one possible doctrinal framing for that risk.67 She argues
that allowing cities (and some other large, broad-purposed associa-
tions) to invoke broad associational standing is in “conflict” or at
least “serious tension” with another important standing princi-
ple—the ban on “pure private attorneys general”68 for whom Article
III standing requirements impose no meaningful limit. She raises
important questions about the limits of municipal associational
standing and how we define who belongs in a city, a challenge I take
up in part below. Ultimately, however, I find that concerns over the
scope of city standing need not dash our hopes for responsibly ap-
plied municipal associational standing.
The Supreme Court has generally said that private parties may
not be pure private attorneys general—that is, they may not bring
cases without having suffered a cognizable injury (or representing
62. Caruso, supra note 3.
63. Swan, supra note 4.
64. Elliott, supra note 18, at 1333-34.
65. Id. at 1381 (“Hunt permits at least some, and perhaps many, organizations and
municipalities to act as nearly pure private attorneys general.”).
66. See Caruso, supra note 3, at 82.
67. See Elliott, supra note 18, at 1333.
68. Id. at 1333-35, 1380. Analogous concerns have recently been raised about state
standing—that applying standing tests meant for private litigants to states results in too
much standing. See, e.g., Woolhandler & Collins, supra note 6, at 2023-24, 2028-29. I find
these arguments interesting but unpersuasive; the number of an entity’s otherwise-valid
interests should not trigger special rules to keep them out of court.
12
William & Mary Law Review Online, Vol. 62 [2021], Art. 5
https://scholarship.law.wm.edu/wmlronline/vol62/iss1/5
2021] MUNICIPAL ASSOCIATIONAL STANDING REEXAMINED 117
someone who has).69 Professor Elliot contends that cities’ size (that
is, the number of “members” from which a city might draw a harmed
person to support standing) and broad array of municipal “purposes”
combine under associational standing doctrine to make cities
functionally unconstrained, nearly pure private attorneys general
in a way that is inconsistent with Article III.70
1. Membership: The Limits and Risks of Defining Who Belongs
a. Who Counts as a Member?
As noted above, where an entity is not organized as a membership
organization, it may still invoke associational standing if, function-
ally, the “specialized segment” of the population that it serves
“possess all of the indicia of membership in an organization.”71 The
Hunt Court identified several “indicia of membership”: the de facto
members “alone elect the members of the Commission; they alone
may serve on the Commission; they alone finance its activities,
including the costs of [a] lawsuit, through assessments levied upon
them.”72 Lower courts have added to or broadened these indicia, for
69. Elliott, supra note 18, at 1333; see Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 736-39 (1972)
(noting that public interest cases still require cognizable injury, as do organizations, as “a
mere ‘interest in a problem,’ no matter how longstanding the interest and no matter how
qualified the organization is in evaluating the problem, is not sufficient by itself to” establish
a claim under the APA).
70. See Elliott, supra note 18, at 1366-67, 1378-79 (“[B]ecause associations have standing
wherever their members have standing, associations may base their standing on the risks
that their members face.... That organization will thus be able to satisfy Hunt if it can satisfy
the germaneness prong; the broader the organization’s purpose, the more likely it will have
associational standing.”). She concedes that cities are not exactly “private” attorneys general.
See id. at 1371 n.242, 1378 (describing a litigating city as a pure “private” attorney general
“at least in the sense that it is not the attorney general of the United States” or a state). It
suffices for present purposes to treat them as such, as I have largely argued that cities must
be prepared to invoke associational standing on the same footing as any private entity. But
as Professor Young observed of state standing, while Justices and critics complain of “private
attorneys general” and class counsel as unaccountable, governments suing for their citizens
are not. Young, supra note 42, at 1923-24.
71. Hunt v. Wash. State Apple Advert. Comm’n, 432 U.S. 333, 344 (1977).
72. Id. at 344-45; cf. AARP v. EEOC, 226 F. Supp. 3d 7, 17-18 (D.D.C. 2016) (noting the
limited extent to which members generated the AARP’s budget and controlled its activities
but finding that sufficient for standing for the membership organization). See generally
Katherine Mims Crocker, An Organizational Account of State Standing, 94 NOTRE DAME L.
REV. 2057, 2075-77 (2019) (arguing that states meet the indicia of membership).
13
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example, adding the voluntariness of membership73 and other
accountability mechanisms between clients or members and the
organization.74 These cases suggest a somewhat flexible analysis,
but one that strongly (and in some circuits, exclusively) centers on
whether “members” can guide the association’s activities, comprise
and select its leadership, and finance its work.75
I concede that it is not intuitive to think of city residents as
“members” of a city.76 But intuition will not do as a substitute for
careful comparison, and as I and others have noted, cities are
legally, practically, and sometimes emotionally salient representa-
tives of their residents.77 “[C]ities ... are constituted by their obli-
gation to respond to community concerns and to care for their
residents”;78 they exist almost exclusively to serve their residents,
and their leaders are directly elected to that end. They are, at their
core, agents of the public as a whole. Perhaps unsurprisingly, then,
many people do affiliate with their hometowns and expect those
places to protect them and pursue their best interests.79 Indeed,
Professor Sarah Swan has argued that bringing affirmative lit-
igation to protect residents’ well-being can itself be part of a city’s
“statebuilding” efforts—that is, the ways it constructs itself as a
legitimate political entity and community.80
73. Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Chevron Chem. Co., 129 F.3d 826, 829 (5th Cir. 1997)
(treating this indicator as helpful, though obviously not required in light of Hunt).
74. Or. Advoc. Ctr. v. Mink, 322 F.3d 1101, 1110-12 (9th Cir. 2003) (granting standing
based on other indicia, where a protection and advocacy organization was not funded by
client/members and they did not exclusively control the organization or comprise its board).
But cf. Disability Advocs., Inc. v. N.Y. Coal. for Quality Assisted Living, Inc., 675 F.3d 149,
157-58 (2d Cir. 2012) (noting split of authority over whether such organizations qualify).
75. See, e.g., Am. Legal Found. v. FCC, 808 F.2d 84, 90-91 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (rejecting
standing). Compare NAACP v. Harris, 567 F. Supp. 637, 640 (D. Mass. 1983) (allowing
standing on behalf of the NAACP’s historic “constituency” as distinct from its membership,
notwithstanding the indicia), with Hope, Inc. v. County of DuPage, 738 F.2d 797, 814-15 (7th
Cir. 1984) (refusing to extend standing based on injuries to a constituency rather than
members).
76. See Elliott, supra note 18, at 1373; see also City of Olmsted Falls v. FAA, 292 F.3d 261,
267-68 (D.C. Cir. 2002) (rejecting the idea that cities have voluntary members, asserting that
the City was simply “attempting to assert the alleged interests of its citizens under the
doctrine of parens patriae”); Prince George’s County v. Levi, 79 F.R.D. 1, 5 (D. Md. 1977)
(similar).
77. See Caruso, supra note 3, at 77.
78. Mendelson, supra note 14, at 256.
79. See id.
80. Swan, supra note 4, at 1284-85.
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But even if I am right, this does not fully answer Professor
Elliott’s concerns; she rightly asks, who specifically, among those
who live, work, or otherwise spend time there, is a city “member?”81
That question has several parts.
i. Better Together
The first question is—at what level of generality will the court
consider the question? Will it accept evidence that the city’s
residents as a group exhibit the indicia of membership? Or will it
require the specific individuals that the city claims are harmed (for
purposes of showing that a member has Article III standing) to
satisfy many or all of those indicators?
This difference matters: if the city must identify individual
residents who both satisfy all the indicia and suffer the relevant
Article III injury, perhaps the pool from which even big cities can
draw is smaller than we might first imagine. Worse, if that is the
case, a city may be unable to protect significant portions of its
population—especially those least able to protect themselves, as
discussed at greater length below.
Primarily, then, a city looking to invoke associational standing
should vociferously frame the analysis as whether its residents
collectively meet the standard—comprising, electing, and guiding
city leadership, and financing municipal activity through taxes and
fees. And, indeed, this collective approach seems the most consis-
tent with Hunt: there, the Court did not, for example, focus on
whether any particular grower relied on the association to represent
its views regarding grading or interstate marketing.82
A skeptical court, however, might require a city to show that the
specific people on which it relies for Article III standing satisfy the
Hunt indicia.83 In that case, the analysis gets more challenging, and
cities may be less able to invoke the interests of everyone in their
communities.
81. Elliott, supra note 18, at 1373-76.
82. See Hunt v. Wash. State Apple Advert. Comm’n, 432 U.S. 333, 343-44 (1977).
83. See, e.g., Wash. Legal Found. v. Leavitt, 477 F. Supp. 2d 202, 209-11 (D.D.C. 2007)
(examining the named individuals’ indicia of membership in the litigating organization).
15
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ii. Leadership Participation, Selection and Guidance
City residents collectively select and direct their leadership as
required by Hunt. If a court assesses membership at the city-wide
level, a city can show that its residents both comprise and choose its
leadership. Elected officials will at least generally be responsible for
authorizing the suit and can be held to account by residents for it.
Notwithstanding dismal rates of participation in municipal elec-
tions,84 this level of community involvement surely exceeds that of
many nonprofits that have been given associational standing.
If a court rejects a community-level assessment, however, this
criterion will narrow who counts as a member. On this more
restrictive interpretation, “members” might only include those who
can vote in the municipal elections most relevant to the suit (e.g., for
the City Attorney, Mayor, or Board of Supervisors, depending on
how the suit is authorized). And if membership is tied to voting
eligibility, the relevant members would generally seem to be adult
residents, and likely only U.S. citizens, depending on the city’s
voting rules.85 Members might also include participants of any
relevant city advisory board or committee, but certainly will not
include the entire city, if city residents are disaggregated for the
purpose of the standing analysis.
iii. Financing City Activity
The question of whether members finance city activities is also
fairly straightforward at the community level. It is true that cities
derive funding from many sources, including the federal govern-
ment,86 in addition to their residents. However, Hunt appeared to
84. A research team at Portland State University compared voting rates in local elections
across cities and concluded that local voting rates are “abysmally low.” See Carson Gorecki,
Stephanie Hawke, Phil Keisling, Jason R. Jurjevich, & Kevin Rancik, Who Votes for Mayor?,
URB. STUD. AND PLAN. FAC. PUBL’NS AND PRESENTATIONS (2016), https://pdxscholar.library.
pdx.edu/usp_fac/166 [https://perma.cc/M4PJ-62WS].
85. Wiseman, supra note 48, at 647, 649 (noting that “some municipalities ... allow
noncitizens and sixteen-year-old[s] ... to vote” and that cities “generally only speak for the
voting residents within their boundaries,” though some states allow municipalities to let
nonresidents vote on some issues).
86. See, e.g., THE CITY OF NEW YORK OFFICE OF THE COMPTROLLER, PRELIMINARY
COMPTROLLER ANALYSIS: FEDERAL FUNDING AND NEW YORK CITY’S BUDGET (2016), https://
16
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focus on financing at least in substantial part because of its role in
member accountability, so probably not all funding need come from
members.87 Moreover, many nonprofits and associations likewise
receive at least some grant or other funding.88 Generally, then,
cities’ revenue schemes should favor a finding that residents are city
members.89
But again, things are slightly more complex at the individual-
member level. Not everyone eligible to vote, for example, will pay
much in taxes. Even where there is a local income tax, the poorest
community members may have little income and owe no taxes. But
if paying nothing satisfies their local tax obligations, they should
still be construed as meeting this criterion—after all, other asso-
ciations may offer free membership but request contributions or
charge a membership fee on a sliding scale.90
Even apart from income taxes, most residents pay into city coffers
in some non-negligible way; they likely pay more in local sales
taxes, parking and other municipal service fees than they would to
be a member of many private associations.91 The precise contours of
this analysis will depend on the structure of local taxes and fees,
but, if needed, showing that a city’s injured members contribute to
the city budget should be straightforward in many cases.
iv. Voluntary Association
Some courts have considered voluntariness of participation to be
a helpful but optional indicator of membership beyond Hunt’s listed
comptroller.nyc.gov/wp-content/uploads/2016/11/Federal_Budget_Vulnerabilities_Memo.pdf
[https://perma.cc/PG25-Y478].
87. See, e.g., Or. Advoc. Ctr. v. Mink, 322 F.3d 1101, 1110-11 (9th Cir. 2003) (granting
associational standing despite the protection and advocacy system’s receiving most of its
funding from the federal government.).
88. See, e.g., id.
89. Non-residents, even if taxpayers, are unlikely to be members in many cases: for
example, a commuter who pays commuter taxes and local sales taxes on purchases she makes
there will for most purposes still not count. Cf. Elliott, supra note 18, at 1375 (asking whether
commuter-taxpayers will count).
90. Cf. AARP v. EEOC, 226 F. Supp. 3d 7, 17 (D.D.C. 2016) (“Members play a role in
financing AARP's activities ... through the payment of membership dues, although ... not all
AARP members are required to pay dues, as some members’ dues are included in a spouse’s
membership.”).
91. Particular thanks to Jill Habig for pressing me on this point.
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few.92 And although parts of local government law and theory have
long centered on the notion that municipalities compete for res-
idents, it would be a gross exaggeration to say that people can leave
their cities as easily as they can quit, say, AARP.93 Merely living
and continuing to live in a city is no assurance of total voluntariness
if one is practically or financially unable to move. Especially if the
city must define members at the individual level, residence is an
especially weak signal of voluntary membership.
Even so, if this factor is anything, it is positive. Voluntariness is
absolutely doctrinally optional, given that the membership in Hunt
was legally mandated; a weak signal of voluntariness is thus
perhaps a weak doctrinal plus.94 At the end of the day, what cities
may lack in voluntariness relative to other associations, they likely
gain in (democratic) accountability, which is fundamental to the
Hunt analysis.95
* * * 
All told, cities should argue that the indicia of membership should
be analyzed at the community, rather than individual, level. They
must also, however, be prepared to concretely identify who among
their residents meet the indicia of membership relative to the suit
in question. Though there may be some room to argue for additional
indicia (like voluntariness) to factor into the analysis, cities should
expect to have to show that they meet at least all or nearly all of the
Hunt factors.
92. See, e.g., Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Chevron Chem. Co., 129 F.3d 826, 829 (5th Cir.
1997).
93. See Caruso, supra note 3, at 76 & nn.94-95 (noting that the idea of competing for
residents has pervaded local government cases and scholarship and the controversy over how
voluntary these associations really are); Elliott, supra note 18, at 1374 n.260 (noting that the
assumptions about voluntariness and exit options may be far less realistic for poorer and
lesser-advantaged residents of a community).
94. See Hunt v. Wash. State Apple Advert. Comm’n, 432 U.S. 333, 345 (1977) (“Nor do we
find it significant in determining whether the Commission may properly represent its
constituency that ‘membership’ is ‘compelled’ in the form of mandatory assessments.”).
95. Cf. Wiseman, supra note 48, at 650 (“[M]unicipalities arguably provide more
opportunities for members to voice objections, whereas shareholders can arguably more easily
exit a traditional corporation than a municipality.”).
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It is undoubtedly true, as Professor Elliott notes, that big cities
could have a deep pool of residents from which to identify injured
members.96 But it is possible (though, I think, misguided) that a
court could decide to conduct the indicia of membership analysis
focused just on those harmed individuals. This seems particularly
likely if a city is relying on a harm to one or a very few of its
residents. But as we have seen, a city is ill-advised invite such a
tighter focus in the mine run of cases; such a narrow view of which
members should “count” is not compelled by Hunt and seems less
(not more) likely to lead to a grant of city standing in some cases.
b. How Many Members Is Enough?
The Supreme Court’s standing cases say that one member with
an Article III injury suffices to support associational standing.97
Despite the challenges outlined above, there may be a city that opts
to pursue an associational case based on harms to just one resident.
Even if that city successfully establishes the requisite Hunt indicia
of membership, the city, especially if it is large, should expect
judicial skepticism elsewhere in the associational analysis as well.98
While the precise status of the various third-party prudential
standing limitations in federal court remains unclear,99 we can still
expect courts to closely scrutinize a claim brought by a city of, say,
nine million people to vindicate the interests of just one.
Professor Elliott seems to view the number of potential “mem-
bers” from which to identify an affected person and the number and
breadth of municipal purposes as layers of weak limitation that
combine to create an essentially meaningless restraint.100 However,
we might equally expect them to operate in tandem the opposite
way. A court may, for example, be less willing to decide that a
96. See supra note 70 and accompanying text.
97. See, e.g., Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 511 (1975).
98. See, e.g., Telecomms. Rsch. & Action Ctr. v. ALLNET Commc’n Servs., Inc., 806 F.2d
1093, 1095-96 (D.C. Cir. 1986); Action All. for Senior Citizens of Greater Phila. v. Shapp, 400
F. Supp. 1208, 1213 (E.D. Pa. 1975) (granting standing to seek injunctive relief to benefit 6
of 3,500 members, but noting that “we might feel more confident of [the association's] taking
a vigorous, adversarial stance had plaintiff been able to identify more members adversely
affected by the Act”).
99. See supra notes 22-27 and accompanying text. 
100. See Elliott, supra note 18, at 1378-80.
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dispute is germane to a city’s purpose when the problem only affects
a single resident; it might either discard the suit altogether as not
germane or require the city to show an explicit state law giving it a
very specific purpose or interest justifying the suit.
2. Municipal Purposes Have Meaning, and Limits
a. Municipal Purposes Are Set by State and Local Statutory,
Regulatory, Constitutional, and Common Law
Municipalities do a lot. Those many municipal powers and func-
tions are largely determined by state statutory, constitutional,
common, and local laws validly adopted pursuant to those powers.101
Many, if not most, cities have at least some type of broad “police
power” to protect the health and welfare of those within their
jurisdiction, on top of myriad explicit responsibilities allocated by
more specific state laws and regulatory schemes.102 Just as scholars
have argued when considering the breadth and diversity of states’
interests, however, the very fact that cities have so many different
authorities and responsibilities does not lessen their obligations
under, or commitments to, any of them.103
How a city will prove that a given suit is germane to its purposes
will vary by issue and case. Often, I expect, it will be by pointing to
an eclectic mix of state and local law—in some cases, determined by
state constitutional powers or unfunded state mandates; in others,
by local ordinances. Those powers and duties, when matched to
what a city is actually doing to help its residents, well support
standing; in Hunt, after all, the Court returned to the impacts the
Commission would suffer itself as reassurance that standing was
appropriate.104
101. See Caruso, supra note 3, at 81-82.
102. See id. at 81-82, 82 n.123.
103. See Young, supra note 42, at 1902 (“[S]tate litigants engage in a broader range of
activities than most plaintiffs. But ... the burden should be on opponents of state standing to
explain why those differences are relevant to the basic principles of Article III.”); Crocker,
supra note 72, at 2072 (“[T]he fact that states’ proprietary interests are so diffuse that a host
of federal-government actions could cause them injuries does not make those injuries
generalized grievances.”). But cf. Woolhandler & Collins, supra note 6, at 2024 (expressing
concerns that states have nearly limitless interests that, if injured, could support standing).
104. Hunt v. Wash. State Apple Advert. Comm’n, 432 U.S. 333, 345 (1977). Whether those
20
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City purposes, explained this way, are broad and varied, but do
not cover the waterfront. The robust scholarship on federal and
state preemption of local action itself suggests as much.105 Moreover,
the idea that city purposes are a category without meaningful
boundaries discounts the fact that a city’s legal interest in an issue
is a function of both power and process. Such a view ignores state-
government actors’ pervasive structuring, monitoring, and editing
of areas of local authority and discretion (including cities’ ability to
litigate), to which a recent wave of scholarship regarding “hyper
preemption” bears witness.106 Nor is litigation an area where states
hesitate to step in; indeed, some states opposing cities’ affirmative
litigation have adopted laws specifically blocking certain kinds of
city cases.107
Professor Elliott, too, acknowledges that it is unlikely that
municipal associational standing is so broad that a city could bring
absolutely any suit it wished, and so the doctrinal friction she
identifies is not an absolute conflict.108 Even so, she argues, the
conflict ought to be remedied “given the Court’s separation-of-
powers rhetoric and the emphasis it has placed on a strict doctrine
of standing,” and given that “it violates our ideas of the rule of law
that courts would simultaneously prohibit and allow an action.”109
efforts could give rise to standing under other theories is beyond the scope of this Essay. Cf.,
e.g., Cook County v. McAleenan, 417 F. Supp. 3d 1008, 1018 (N.D. Ill. 2019) (relying on City
of Milwaukee v. Saxbe, 546 F.2d 693 (7th Cir. 1976), to conclude that a municipality can claim
standing under the diversion of resources theory of organizational standing).
105. See, e.g., Swan, supra note 12.
106. See, e.g., Erin Adele Scharff, Hyper-Preemption: A Reordering of the State-Local
Relationship?, 106 GEO. L.J. 1469, 1473 (2018).
107. Savit, supra note 18, at 589-93 (noting that states preempt affirmative city litigation
through direct legislation, by preempting local regulation that could support enforcement
suits, and through their own litigation); Swan, supra note 12, at 1246-56 (discussing state
preemption of city litigation through examples of preclusive settlements, litigation, and
legislation).
108. Elliott, supra note 18, at 1392 (acknowledging that the issue “may be [just] short ...
of a true conflict” such that it “need not be fixed”).
109. Id. at 1393 (footnote omitted). Professor Fred Smith has recently and persuasively
argued, however, that the increasing constitutionalization of prudential standing principles
in fact stifles Congress’s ability to play its constitutional part in defining the role of the courts.
See Fred O. Smith, Jr., Undemocratic Restraint, 70 VAND. L. REV. 845, 878 (2017). That debate
well exceeds the scope of this Essay. However, it bears noting that Professor Smith’s work
suggests, at least, that the strict notions of standing to which Professor Elliott refers are not
an automatic constitutional good.
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C. Municipal Associational Standing Is Manageable and 
Appropriate
Professor Elliott has helpfully described the tension between the
potentially numerous and varied cases in which a city could validly
claim associational standing and the need to guard against uncon-
strained “pure private attorneys general.”110 Looked at from a
distance and in the abstract, the conceptual tension is indeed
concerning. Looked at in the context of actual litigation, though,
with demonstrated harms and specific municipal purposes affected
by them, it becomes far less alarming.
Consider a case in which a city invokes associational standing: it
identifies a specific harm to its residents, shows that the harm
affects the city’s own well-being, and articulates which of its local
powers and responsibilities make that harm “germane” to a
legitimate city “purpose.” The need to avoid creating a pure private
attorney general will doubtless be raised by the defendant in an
effort to defeat standing, and that need offers the court an outer
limit to when it should validate city standing. Like any plaintiff, the
city will have to convince the judge that its interests are real,
substantial, and cognizable and that it is no roving enforcer of the
law. This is the bread-and-butter stuff of a skilled litigator, though,
and necessitates no doctrinal overhaul.
There likely will be cases in which the connection between claim
and city purpose is too attenuated to convince a court to read
standing doctrine generously in the city’s favor. I doubt any of us
will agree with every ruling on whether a city gets associational
standing, as amply demonstrated by the differing attitudes of the
Seventh and D.C. Circuits in City of Milwaukee v. Saxbe and City of
Olmsted Falls v. FAA.111 Given the range of acceptable outcomes in
even a well-designed doctrine, however, the problem with Olmsted
Falls is not the result—it is that the analysis is based on instincts
about cities rather than a careful consideration of the state law that
constructs what a city is “for.”
110. Elliot, supra note 18, at 1333-35; see supra notes 64-70 and accompanying text.
111. Compare City of Milwaukee v. Saxbe, 546 F.2d 693, 698-99 (7th Cir. 1976), with City
of Olmsted Falls v. FAA, 292 F.3d 261, 267-68 (D.C. Cir. 2002).
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There is, in sum, no great need to dispense with municipal
associational standing to avoid creating thousands of pure private
attorneys general. No judge will ever have to decide which doctrine
wins out—only where on the spectrum of interests, from directly
injured to freewheeling private attorney general, the city’s role in a
particular case lies. But the ordinary filtering processes of litigation
are more than up to the task of addressing edge cases where a city
might push too far; we need not discard an entire avenue of
standing to guard against that risk.
III. PATHWAYS TO CITY STANDING
It is worth pausing here to consider the stakes of this debate.
Does it matter, really, whether a city can bring a representational
case in federal court?112 In practice, there are relatively few
cases—especially against private parties—in which a city’s case
really needs to be in federal court,113 and cities can often get around
a lack of federal standing by, for example, partnering with a
nonprofit whose standing is more certain114 or bringing the case in
state court. There will be some cases where it matters, of course: for
example, if a city wants to sue the federal government,115 invoke
certain federal statutes, or to intervene in litigation to seek differ-
ent or better relief for its residents.116 But in most representation-
al suits it will not.
In that sense, the potentially greater risk posed by federal cases
that limit city standing is that the rationale of those cases may be
contagious. Enough state courts follow federal standing precedents
112. Cf. Caruso, supra note 3, at 97 (rejecting the idea that city suits belong just in state
court).
113. See generally Robert A. Mikos, Standing for Nothing, 94 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 2033
(2019) (arguing that states rarely actually need standing in federal court to protect their own
laws).
114. See Caruso, supra note 3, at 71.
115. Some have understandably expressed concern about the trend toward resolution, and
constitutionalization, of federal politics and policy through federal litigation. See, e.g., Ernest
A. Young, supra note 42, at 1918-21. Even if this is a problem, however, a unique
disadvantage imposed upon cities relative to other parties hardly seems like the solution. Cf.
id. at 1919-20 (making a parallel point regarding state standing). Suits against the federal
government, like suits against a city’s own state, will present federalism challenges that may
require issue-by-issue consideration.
116. See Town of Chester v. Laroe Ests., 137 S. Ct. 1645, 1648 (2017).
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that such logic may spread back into state court—where cities
should have the best shot at a good, hard look at city interests
pursuant to state law.117 It is worth it, then, to encourage federal
courts to do a better job of accounting for cities in standing doctrine,
particularly where it can impact city residents’ access to justice vel
non.118
So, how federal courts treat city standing matters. Given that,
even if associational standing is one route to federal court, we
should examine all avenues to get cities there. Standing doctrine
generally has long been criticized as messy, irrational, ahistorical,
and even misleading.119 And despite late Justice Scalia’s attempt in
Lexmark to clarify parts of prudential standing,120 I share others’
skepticism that a wholesale rationalization of standing doctrine is
on the near horizon.121 Certainly, it seems that a clear, predictable
standing mechanism for cities to bring representational cases
would be preferable to current affairs. In that spirit, let us briefly
consider other recent proposals for modest reforms to bring cities
reliably and successfully into federal court, and how they might
compare with municipal associational standing.
A. Statutory Enforcement Power
Professor Kathleen Morris, among others, argues that the best
way to let cities bring impact cases is to give them statutory
enforcement authority (especially in consumer protection laws).122
With this approach, cities generally need not build huge factual
records to support standing, harm, and causation; instead, the case
focuses on whether the defendant’s conduct is lawful.123
117. See, e.g., Coldsprings Township v. Kalkaska Cnty. Zoning Bd. of Appeals, 755 N.W.2d
553, 556 (Mich. Ct. App. 2008) (following federal standing analysis in Olmsted Falls and
rejecting associational standing); Tuma v. Kerr County, 336 S.W.3d 277, 281 (Tex. Ct. App.
2010) (rejecting without analysis the notion of a county as an “association of individuals”
given standing by statute).
118. See generally Habig & Pearl, supra note 10, at 1162-65.
119. See Elliott, supra note 18, at 1334-35, 1334 n.17.
120. See supra notes 24-26 and accompanying text.
121. Elliott, supra note 18, at 1383-85.
122. See Morris, Expanding Local Enforcement, supra note 18, at 1907-08; Morris, supra
note 1, at 203.
123. See Morris, supra note 1, at 203.
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This is by far the tidiest resolution, where the legislators are
willing, and the harm is covered by statute. It should be sought
whenever possible, particularly in public rights laws. Interesting
federalism questions arise when the federal government directly
empowers a city,124 but enforcement authority should be broadly
sought in both federal and state statutes. Absent legislative
cooperation, though, and for harms not covered by statute, other
broad, flexible standing theories will still be required.
B. A Return to Parens Patriae
Professor Eli Savit recently argued for individual states to remedy
standing gaps by expressly delegating to cities parens patriae
authority to sue.125 The Supreme Court has not allowed states to
delegate their sovereign interests to just any private party, instead
concluding (on one reading, anyway) that each state is free to choose
which of its officials or true agents may represent its interests in
court.126 Accordingly, to benefit from delegated parens patriae
authority, a city must define itself to the court as merely an arm or
agent of the state.127 That description of local power is persuasively
124. See Morris, Expanding Local Enforcement, supra note 18, at 1926-27; Morris, Local
Constitutional Enforcement, supra note 18, at 6-7, 43 (objecting as a constitutional and
historical matter to the idea of state plenary control of city powers and noting one theory of
federalism that would exclude federal involvement in state-local relationships); Davidson,
supra note 46, at 960-61; Roderick M. Hills, Jr., Dissecting the State: The Use of Federal Law
to Free State and Local Officials from State Legislatures' Control, 97 MICH. L. REV. 1201, 1201
(1999) (analyzing whether “the federal government [must] take state institutions as it finds
them, or can ... expand these institutions’ powers even in the teeth of state laws that seem to”
preclude such an expansion); Bendor, supra note 9, at 421-22 (arguing that federal supremacy
allows federal delegations of powers to cities even over state objections).
125. Savit, supra note 18, at 608-09.
126. Cf. United States v. Walker River Irrigation Dist., No. 3:73-cv-00128-RCJ-WGC, at
*6 (D. Nev. May 28, 2015) (CaseText) (“The Idaho Supreme Court has ruled that a state
statute providing county prosecutors with the duty to ‘prosecute or defend all actions ... in the
district court of his county in which the people, or the state, or the county, are interested’
provides county prosecutors with standing to assert the public’s right to recreation on private
land. Because municipalities are not sovereign, however, absent such a statute explicitly
providing standing, they cannot bring parens patriae suits on behalf of their residents.”
(citation omitted)). Compare Hollingsworth v. Perry, 570 U.S. 693, 712-13 (2013) (concluding
that delegating a state’s interest in the enforceability of its law was not enough to confer
standing on a private party absent a proper agency relationship or an otherwise cognizable
injury), with id. at 715-17 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (debating this point). 
127. Savit, supra note 18, at 609-10.
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contested as a practical and doctrinal matter and as a matter of
state constitutional law and history,128 but may present distinct
advantages in practical terms for establishing standing in federal
court under current doctrines.129
Delegated parens patriae reverses the challenges and strengths
of associational standing. The city would have to emphasize its
public rather than its corporate attributes in litigation.130 Parens
patriae standing more closely matches our intuitions about cities,
but would require an express, litigation-directed delegation from
the state to overcome the weight of precedent holding that being an
arm of the state prevents rather than enables cities’ exercise of
parens patriae standing.131 Of course, one could argue that, even
absent an explicit delegation, when states share some of their
caretaking and governing interests by giving cities autonomy (or by
enmeshing them in a state-local governance framework), a corre-
sponding portion of the state’s parens patriae power should follow.
Unfortunately, courts have often, though not always,132 been un-
moved by similar claims. An express delegation in some form is,
therefore, probably required for success.
Professor Savit’s proposal, therefore, is contingent on support
from state-level actors. It is likely more attainable than state
statutory standing, however, as it can require support from fewer
actors: Professor Savit argues that the delegation could come either
as a statute or unilaterally from an attorney general.133 It is thus
more politically dependent than a claim of associational standing,
though less so than statutory standing. Conversely, if adopted by a
unilateral (and presumably revocable) delegation, it may be less
128. See, e.g., Morris, Local Constitutional Enforcement, supra note 18, at 32-34.
129. Caruso, supra note 9; see also Morris, Local Constitutional Enforcement, supra note
18, at 37 (“[A] legal rule that undermines [local] autonomy might simultaneously enhance
[local] power, and vice versa.”).
130. That is to say, a city would have to emphasize its identity as an “arm of the state,”
rather than as analogous to other corporate organizations or associations, to gain standing.
Cf. Caruso, supra note 9 (suggesting the advantages of emphasizing municipalities’ corporate
natures, including in standing).
131. See supra notes 44-45 and accompanying text.
132. See In re Del. Pub. Schs. Litig., 239 A.3d 451, 520-21 (Del. Ch. 2020) (recognizing that,
under Delaware law, a city had parens patriae standing to sue on behalf of its residents due
to its home rule authority).
133. Savit, supra note 18, at 611-12.
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durable than statutory standing, but likely more reliable than as-
sociational standing, at least as the doctrine currently stands.
C. A Unified Theory of Standing for Organizations
Professor Katherine Mims Crocker’s recent work on state rep-
resentational standing suggests another intriguing alternative.134
Highlighting the similarities between parens patriae and associa-
tional standing and between standing for state proprietary and pri-
vate organizational economic harms, she argues that courts could
unify all of these doctrines under the general umbrella of organiza-
tional standing.135 Professor Crocker argues that the parallels be-
tween the doctrines should make us more comfortable with the
seemingly broad and ill-defined standing that states have in federal
court.136 I would argue that such a unified approach to standing for
organizations of all stripes should similarly increase comfort with
broad local standing under either theory.137
Professor Elliott has noted that this approach does nothing to
ameliorate her concerns with potentially broad municipal
standing.138 But that objection misses the mark. Professor Crocker
has offered an avenue for us to clearly define and articulate the
differences between public and private associations as litigants and
pinpoint precisely where in the standing doctrine those differences
matter. If we avail ourselves of that opportunity, we will have a
134. Crocker, supra note 72.
135. See id. at 2070.
136. See id. But cf. Seth Davis, supra note 33, at 2121-23 (arguing that state
representational cases may justify special disfavor or special solicitude in federal court).
137. Crocker and Elliott seem to agree that if localities can invoke associational standing,
they have an advantage over states invoking parens patriae because the latter requires harm
to a substantial portion of residents while the former needs only a single injured member. See
Elliott, supra note 18, at 1376 (first citing Crocker, supra note 72, at 2079-80; and then citing
Margaret H. Lemos & Ernest A. Young, State Public-Law Litigation in an Age of Polarization,
97 TEX. L. REV. 43, 112-13 (2018)). As noted above, it is not clear that a court would find such
a case germane to city purposes, see supra note 100 and accompanying text, nor is a city likely
to commit resources to such a case. Moreover, as Crocker notes, it is not clear whether the
multiple affected residents under parens patriae must have an Article III injury; it could be
that the standards have offsetting advantages, requiring, respectively, fewer members with
Article III injuries versus more members with more abstract harms. See Crocker, supra note
72, at 2078-79.
138. Elliott, supra note 18, at 1376 n.266.
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better way to account for standing for cities—potentially a way that
accounts for their complicated public-but-not-sovereign nature.139
Given an integrated theory of standing for public and private
associations, the ban on private attorneys general seems even less
sensibly to apply to cities.
CONCLUSION
People matter to their cities, and cities often matter to their
people. Recent trends nationally show that local voices remain ur-
gently needed to speak up for their residents, even as trends also
show a mounting hostility to local impact litigation and standing.
Cities will often hurt—albeit somewhat differently—when their
residents do, and so have every reason to speak directly to both of
those harms. Representational standing doctrines in federal court
need not ignore that connection.
Our current structure for public protection litigation contains too
little redundancy to withstand changes in circumstance and politics
at state and federal levels, and as a result important public rights
and norms go underenforced.140 Adopting and recognizing a stable
form of municipal representational standing and situating it clearly
within the broader universe of representational standing, would
afford the public additional assurance that someone can speak up
for it. Although the mixed nature of the case law means that the
question is hardly free from doubt, associational standing can and
should remain a viable option for allowing cities to do just that.
139. This approach is different from the more pragmatic recommendation that I have made
previously regarding the advantages to cities of embracing their identities as corporations
rather than arguing for status as mini-sovereigns. See Caruso, supra note 9. I maintain that
under present doctrine, cities are and should be able to claim associational standing on
fundamentally the same terms as other associations. However, Professor Crocker’s taxonomy,
if it produces a refined standing doctrine that encompasses both associational and parens
patriae standing, might be able to create space for cities to claim standing based on the
fullness of their interests, simultaneously “public” and “private.” 
140. Habig & Pearl, supra note 10, at 1162-65, 1187-88.
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